

OTHER PAPERS

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Psychological Alternatives to War

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I shall assume the truth of the following propositions:

(1) A large-scale nuclear war would achieve a result that no sane man could desire.

(2) When a small war occurs, there is a risk that it may turn into a large war; this risk would be considerably enhanced by the use of nuclear weapons. In the course of many small wars, the probability of a great war would become almost a certainty.

(3) The knowledge and capacity to make nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction cannot be destroyed; they will exist as long as mankind exists.

(4) Any war in which a nuclear power is faced with the possibility of major defeat or a despairing outcome is likely to turn into a large-scale nuclear war even if nuclear disarmament had previously occurred.

(5) A hostile peace will not long endure. From these propositions it follows that, if mankind is to avoid utter disaster, we must see to it that irrational men are not in a position to initiate nuclear war, we must find alternatives to war for resolving international conflicts, and we must develop the conditions which will lead conflicting nations to select one or another of these alternatives rather than resort to war.

My discussion in this paper centers primarily on the question of: how do we take the hostility out of the hostile peace? This question proliferates into other, related questions: how do we prevent the misperceptions and misunderstandings in international relations which foster and perpetuate hostility? how do we move from a delicately

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balanced peace of mutual terror to a sturdy peace of mutual trust? how do we move in the direction of a world community in which law, institutions, obligations, and simple human decencies will enable mankind to enjoy a more amiable life? These are the central questions which must be answered if the world is to avoid disaster. The world will never again be in a position where it cannot destroy itself.

It is well for me to emphasize that opposition to war as a means of conflict resolution does *not* connote an opposition to controversy among nations. Controversy is as desirable as it is inevitable. It prevents stagnation, it is the medium through which problems can be aired and solutions arrived at; it is the heart of social change. Our objective is not to create a world in which controversy is suppressed but rather a world in which controversy is civilized; in which it is lively rather than deadly.

I do not pretend to have answers to the difficult questions I have raised. I raise them because I have something relevant to say and because I believe it is important to confront the fundamental questions. Too often we are distracted from them by short-run urgencies. You may well ask what can a psychologist say that is relevant? A wide reading, however, of acknowledged authorities in the study of war and international relations has convinced me that the dominant conceptions of international relations are psychological in nature. Such psychological concepts as "perception," "intention," "value," "hostility," "confidence," "trust," and "suspicion" recur repeatedly in discussions of war and peace.¹

I wish to make it clear that what I have to say in this paper is *not* based upon well-established, scientifically verified, psychological knowledge. As psychologists, we have only meager, fragmentary knowledge of how to prevent or overcome distortions in social perceptions, of how to move from a situation of mutual suspicion to a situation of mutual trust, of how to establish cooperative relationships despite intense competitive orientations, of how to prevent bargaining deadlocks. I take it for granted that we need more and better research before we may claim to speak authoritatively on these matters. However, my intent here is not to outline the research which is needed but rather to discuss these urgent matters as wisely as I can. In so doing, I shall necessarily go beyond the facts to draw upon the

¹ Perhaps there has been too much psychologizing about these matters; there are, after all, critical differences between persons and nations. Not the least of these is the fact that in a deadly quarrel between people it is the quarrelers who are most apt to be killed while, in a deadly quarrel among nations, the decision-makers are rarely the ones who have the highest probability of dying. Be that as it may, I shall assume that there is some merit in viewing nations, like persons, as behaving units in an environment and to conceive of international relations in terms somewhat analogous to those of interpersonal relations.

insights and orientations which I have developed in a research career devoted to the understanding of the conditions affecting cooperation and in a psychoanalytic practice devoted to helping people overcome their self-defeating attitudes and their interpersonal distortions. The proposals which I make in this paper flow from these personal insights and orientations. They are, I believe, consistent with the meager knowledge that we have; but it is apparent that much more research-grounded knowledge is necessary if we are ever to get beyond the stage of "informed hunches." Although my "informed hunches" are offered with personal conviction, I hope that you will understand that my research continues and that I do not plan to leave these hunches untested.

Is War Inevitable?

Is it possible that war is inevitable, that the psychological nature of man is such that war is an indispensable outlet for his destructive urges? True, there have been wars throughout human history and men have found outlets for psychological drives of all kinds in war—sadistic, masochistic, creative, heroic, altruistic, adventurous, etc. Yet, as Jerome Frank (forthcoming) has pointed out, the historical prevalence of a behavior pattern is not proof of its inevitability. Human sacrifice in religious rites, slavery, sorcery, certain forms of child labor, etc., have largely disappeared in modern, industrialized nations although such practices have existed throughout human history.

William James, in his classic paper, "The Moral Equivalent of War" (1911), recognized that war and the military spirit produced certain virtues which are necessary to the survival of any society. However, he went on to point out that militarism and war is not the only means for achieving the virtues of self-discipline and social cohesiveness, that it is possible to find alternative means for achieving the same psychological ends. (It is of interest to note that James's suggestion for a moral equivalent to war was a "Peace Corps" of youth enlisted in an army against *Nature*.) The view that alternative means for satisfying psychological motives can always be found is, of course, a basic concept in modern psychology. Egon Brunswick (1952) went so far as to elevate "vicarious functioning" (i.e., the equivalence and mutual intersubstitutability of different behaviors in relation to goal achievement) to the defining criterion of the subject matter of psychology.

Man's makeup may always contain the psychological characteristics which have found an outlet in militarism and war. There is no reason, however, to doubt that these characteristics can find satisfactory outlets in peaceful pursuits. Aggressiveness, adventurousness, idealism, and bravery will take a peaceful or destructive outlet de-

pending upon the social, cultural, and political conditioning of the individual and upon the behavioral possibilities which exist within his social environment. Some may assert that war provides a more natural, spontaneous, or direct outlet for hostility and aggressiveness than any peaceful alternatives. Such an assertion is based upon a fundamental misconception of war: war is a highly complex, organized social activity in which personal outlets for aggression and hostility are primarily vicarious, symbolic, indirect and infrequent for most of the participants. This is especially true for the highly mechanized warfare of modern times which largely eliminates the direct physical contact between the aggressor and his victim.² Moreover, it is evident that no matter what his psychological make-up, an individual, *per se*, cannot make war. War-making requires the existence of complex social institutions necessary to organize and maintain a "war machine." This is not to say that a war machine cannot be activated by the decision of strategically placed individuals. Obviously, one of the great dangers of our era is that a small group of men have the power to create a nuclear holocaust. Even a strategically placed individual can only activate a war machine if it exists; the mass of people, not being strategically placed, cannot directly activate a war no matter what their psychological predispositions are. It is relevant to note here that research by T. Abel³ indicates that warlike attitudes in the populace tend to follow rather than precede the outbreak of war.

The impersonal character of modern war, as Erich Fromm (1960) has pointed out, makes it difficult for an individual to comprehend fully the meaning of his actions as he kills. It is easier for most people to kill faceless symbols of human beings at a distance than to kill people with one's bare hands. Thus, if the airmen of our Strategic Air Command were suddenly ordered to fly to the Soviet Union or China (or if Soviet airmen were ordered to fly to the U.S.) to drop nuclear weapons, most of them would comply. They would, I assume, be distressed by the thought, but they would comply. Would they comply, if the killings were personal—if they had to burn, mutilate, or suffocate the victims one by one? The psychological danger of modern, impersonal war is not that it is a good outlet for aggression but rather, to the contrary, that it does not permit the button-pusher to appreciate fully the destructive nature of his actions. Were he to do so, his destructive actions might be inhibited rather than encouraged.

² War is vastly over-rated as an outlet for direct aggressiveness; it does not compare with the directness of reckless automobile driving, a boxing match, or a football game. War is defined to be such a good outlet *only* because of our cultural conditioning: the military toys children are given to play with, the identification of heroism and bravery with war in so many novels, TV dramas, and films that we all are exposed to; the definition of patriotism in military terms in so many of our public ceremonials and holidays, etc.

³ T. Abel is cited in Jessie Bernard (1957).

Misperceptions Which Lead to War

Neither war nor peace is psychologically inevitable. Exaggeration of the inevitability of war contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy: it makes war more likely. Exaggeration of the inevitability of peace does not stimulate the intense effort necessary to create the conditions for a durable peace: a stable peace has to be invented and constructed. There is nothing inevitable about it.

A fundamental theorem of the psychological and social sciences is that man's behavior is determined by the world he perceives. Perception is not, however, always veridical to the world which is being perceived. There are a number of reasons why perceptions may be distorted. I would like to consider with you five common causes of misperception, to illustrate the operation of each in international relations, and to indicate how these misperceptions can be counteracted or prevented.

1. *The perception of any act is determined both by our perception of the act itself and by our perception of the context in which the act occurs.* Thus, the statement "You did that extremely well" will be perceived rather differently if a Captain is saying it to a Private than if a Private is saying it to a Captain. A common source of distorted social perception results from misconceptions or false perceptions of context. The contexts of social acts are often not immediately given in perception and often they are not obvious. When the context is not obvious, we tend to assume a familiar context—i.e., the context which is most likely in terms of our own experience. Since both the present situations and past experiences of the actor and the perceiver may be rather different, it is not surprising that they will supply different contexts and interpret the same act quite differently. Misunderstandings of this sort, of course, are very likely when the actor and the perceiver come from rather different cultural backgrounds and they are not fully aware of these differences. The stock conversation of returning tourists consists of amusing or embarrassing anecdotes based upon misunderstandings of this sort.

Urie Bronfenbrenner's first-hand observations (1961) lead him to conclude that the Soviets and Americans have a similar view of one another; each says more or less the same things about the other. For example, each states: "*They* are the aggressors"; *their* government exploits and deludes the people"; "the mass of *their* people is not really sympathetic to the regime"; "*they* cannot be trusted"; "*their* policy verges on madness"; etc.

It is my contention that mutual distortions such as those described above arise, in part, because of an inadequate understanding of the other's context. Take, for instance, the Soviet Union's reluctance to conclude any disarmament agreement which contains adequate pro-

visions for international inspection and control. We view this as a device to prevent an agreement or to subvert any agreement on disarmament which might be worked out. However, as Joseph Nogee has pointed out in his monograph on "The Diplomacy of Disarmament" (1960, p. 275): "Under present circumstances, any international control group reflecting the realities of political power would inevitably include a majority of non-Communist nations. Decisions involving actual and potential interests vital to the USSR would have to be made continuously by a control board the majority of whose members would represent social and economic systems the USSR considers inherently hostile. Any conflicts would ultimately have to be resolved by representatives of governments, and it is assumed that on all major decisions the capitalist nations would vote as a bloc Thus, for the Soviet Union, representation on a control board along the lines proposed by the West would be inherently inequitable"

I may assert that one can subjectively test the creditability of the Soviet position by imagining our own reactions if the Soviet bloc could consistently out-vote us at the UN or on an international disarmament control board. Under such conditions, in the present world situation, would we conclude an agreement which did not give us the security of a veto? I doubt it. Similarly, one can test the creditability of the American position by imagining that the Soviet Union had experienced a Pearl Harbor in a recent war and that it had no open access to information concerning the military preparations of the United States. Under such circumstances, in the present world situation, would it be less concerned about inspection and control than we are? I doubt it.

The distorted view that "the mass of their people are not really sympathetic to the regime" is also based upon an inadequate view of each other's total situation. In effect, we ask ourselves if Soviet citizens had the choice between (a) living in Russia if it were like the United States with its high standard of living and its political system of civil liberties, and (b) living in the present day Soviet Union, which would they choose? We think the answer is obvious, but isn't it clear that the question is wrong? The relevant comparison for them is between their past and their present or future: their present and future is undoubtedly vastly superior to their past. Similarly, the Soviet view is that a comparison between (a) Soviet society with its full employment and expanding economy with (b) capitalism in a permanent depression crisis would favor the Soviet Union. Perhaps it would, but is this the relevant comparison?

How can we prevent and overcome distortions and misunderstandings of this sort? Obviously, more communication, a great increase in interchanges of scholars, artists, politicians, tourists, and the like might be helpful. However, I think we should take cognizance of the findings of the vast body of research on intergroup contact: casual

contact of limited duration is more likely to support deeply rooted distortions than remove them. To have any important effect, contact must be prolonged, functional, and intimate.

I suggest that the most important principle to follow in international communication on issues where there is controversy is one suggested by Anatol Rapoport (forthcoming). He advocates that each side be required to state the position of the other side to the other side's complete satisfaction before either side advocates its own position. Certainly the procedure would not eliminate all conflict but it would eliminate those conflicts based upon misunderstanding. It forces one to place the other's action in a context which is acceptable to the other and, as a consequence, prevents one from arbitrarily rejecting the other's position as unreasonable or badly motivated. This is the strategy followed by the good psychotherapist. By communicating to the patient his full understanding of the patient's behavior and by demonstrating the appropriateness of the patient's assumptions to the patient's behavior and past experiences, he creates the conditions under which the current validity of the patient's assumptions can be examined. The attempt to challenge or change the patient's behavior without mutual understanding of its assumptions usually produces only a defensive adherence to the challenged behavior.

2. *Our perceptions of the external world are often determined indirectly by the information we receive from others rather than by our direct experiences.* Human communication, like perception itself, is always selective. The perception of an event is usually less detailed, more abstract, and less complex than the event which is perceived; the communication about an event is also likely to be less detailed and less complex than its perception. The more human links there are in the communication of information about any event, the more simplified and distorted will be the representation of the event. Distortion in communication tends to take characteristic form: on the one hand, there is a tendency to accentuate the unusual, bizarre, controversial, deviant, violent, and unexpected; on the other hand, there is a tendency for communicators who are communicating to their superiors to communicate only that information which fits in with the preconceptions of their superiors.

If we examine our sources of information about international affairs, we see that they are particularly vulnerable to distorting influences. There are only a small number of American reporters in any country; they do not necessarily work independently of one another. They are under subtle pressure to report items which will catch the reader's interest and conform to their publisher's viewpoint. In a period of hostility between nations, these conditions are not conducive to getting a clear understanding of how events are perceived by the other side or a clear understanding of the other's frame of reference.

I suggest that we should recognize the dangers inherent in not perceiving the other side's point of view regularly. Recognizing these dangers, shouldn't we offer to make arrangements with the Soviet Union whereby we would each be enabled to present our own point of view over the other's radio and TV and in their leading newspapers? Suppose the Soviet leaders are afraid to participate on a reciprocating basis, should we make the offer anyway? My answer is in the form of a question: do we have anything to lose by understanding their viewpoint as well as we can; wouldn't "truth squads" adequately protect us from deliberate attempts to mislead us?

3. *Our perceptions of the world are often very much influenced by the need to conform to and agree with the perceptions of other people.* Thus, in some communities it would be difficult for an individual to survive if he perceived Negroes as his social equals or if he perceived Communist China as having legitimate grievances against the United States. If he acted upon his perceptions he would be ostracized socially; if he conformed to the perceptions of other people without changing his own perceptions, so that they were similar to those prevalent in his community, he might feel little self-respect.

It is my impression that most social and political scientists, most specialists in international relations, most intellectuals who have thought about it, and many of our political leaders personally favor the admission of Communist China into the UN and favor our taking the initiative in attempting to normalize our relations with Communist China. Yet, conformity pressures keep silent most of us who favor such a change in policy. The strength of these conformity pressures in the United States on this issue is so great that it is difficult to think of Communist China or to talk about it in any terms except those which connote absolute, incorrigible evil. I believe this is an extremely dangerous situation, because without a fundamental change in United States-Chinese relations the world may be blown up shortly after China has acquired a stockpile of hydrogen bombs; this may take less than a decade.

How can we break through the veil of conformity and its distorting influences? Asch's (1956) insightful studies of conformity pressures point the way. His studies reveal that when the monolithic social front of conformity is broken by even one dissenter, other potential dissenters feel freer to break with the majority. The lesson is clear: those who dissent must express their opinions so that they are heard by others. If they do so, they may find more agreement than they anticipate.

4. *A considerable body of psychological research⁴ indicates that an individual attempts to perceive his environment in such a way that*

⁴ Much of this research is summarized in various articles in Katz (1960).

it is consistent with his self-perception. If an individual feels afraid, he tends to perceive his world as frightening; if he feels hostile, he is likely to see it as frustrating or unjust; if he feels weak and vulnerable, he is apt to see it as exploitative and powerful; if he is torn by self-doubt and self-conflict, he will tend to see it as at odds with him. Not only does an individual tend to see the external world in such a way as to justify his feelings and beliefs but also so as to justify his behavior. If an individual is a heavy smoker, he is apt to perceive cigarette smoking as less injurious to health than a nonsmoker; if he drives a car and injures a pedestrian, he is likely to blame the pedestrian; if he invests in something (e.g., a munitions industry), he will attempt to justify and protect his investment. Moreover, there is much evidence that an individual tends to perceive the different parts of his world as consistent with one another. Thus, if somebody likes you, you expect him to dislike someone who dislikes you. If somebody disagrees with you, you are likely to expect him to agree with someone who disagrees with you.

The danger of the pressure for consistency is that it often leads to an oversimplified black-white view of the world. Take, for instance, the notions that since the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are opposed in some respects, we must be opposed to or suspicious of anything that the Communists favor and must regard any nation that desires friendly relations with the Soviet Union as opposed to the United States. If the Soviet Union is against colonialism in Africa, must we be for it? If nations in Latin America wish to establish friendly, commercial relations with the Communist nations, must we feel threatened? If Canada helps Communist China by exporting food to it, must we suspect its loyalty to us? Are nations which are not for us necessarily for the Communists? The notions expressed in affirmative answers to these questions are consistent with the view that the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union can only be ended by total defeat for one or the other. But is it not possible that the conflict can be resolved so that both sides are better off than they are now? Recognition of this latter possibility may suggest that what benefits the Soviet Union does not necessarily harm us, and that nations with amicable relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union may be an important asset in resolving the cold war before it turns into a hot one.

The pressure for self-consistency often leads to rigid, inflexible positions because it may be difficult to change a position that one has committed oneself to publicly without fear of loss of face. To some extent, I believe this is our situation vis-à-vis the admission of Communist China to the United Nations and with regard to our policies toward Cuba. We are frozen into positions which are unresponsive to changing circumstances because a change in our positions would seem

to us to be admission of mistaken judgment which could lead to a loss of face.

What can we do to avoid the "consistency of little minds" and the rigidities of false pride? These dangers to accurate perception are most likely when an individual feels under threat, when his self-esteem is at stake. I think in such circumstances it is prudent to seek the advice and counsel of trusted friends who are not so emotionally involved in the issues. Thus, I think it would be wise to consult with such nations as Brazil, France, and Great Britain on our policy toward Cuba and Communist China precisely because they do not have as deep an involvement with these countries as we do. Similarly, consultation with more or less neutral nations such as India, Sweden, Austria, and Nigeria might prevent us from developing an oversimplified view of the nature of our relations with the Soviet Union.

5. Ichheiser (1949) has described a mechanism, similar to that of projection, which leads to misunderstandings in human relations: the *mote-beam mechanism*. It consists in perceiving certain characteristics in others which we do not perceive in ourselves. Thus, the characteristics are perceived as though they were peculiar traits of the others and, hence, the differences between the others and ourselves are accentuated. Since the traits we are unable or unwilling to recognize in others are usually traits we consider to be undesirable, the mote-beam mechanism results in a view of the other as peculiarly shameful or evil. Thus, although many of us who live here in the North easily recognize the shameful racial discrimination and segregation in the South, we avoid a clear awareness of the pervasive racial discrimination in our own communities.

Similarly, in international relations it is easy to recognize the lack of political liberties in the Soviet Union, their domination of the nations in Eastern Europe, their obstructiveness in the United Nations, etc., but it is difficult for us to recognize similar defects in the United States: e.g., the disenfranchisement of most Negro voters in many states, our domination of Latin America, our unfair treatment of the American Indian, our stubbornness in the UN in pretending that the representative from Taiwan is the representative of Mainland China. Since the mote-beam mechanism, obviously, works on both sides, there is a tendency for each side to view the other as peculiarly immoral and for the views to mirror one another.

What can be done to make the mote-beam mechanism ineffective? The proposals I have made to counteract the effects of the other type of perceptual distortions are all relevant here. In addition, I would suggest that the mote-beam mechanism breeds on a moral-evaluative approach to behavior, on a readiness to condemn defects rather than to understand the circumstances which produced them. Psychoanalytic work suggests that the capacity to understand rather than to condemn

is largely determined by the individual's sense of self-esteem, by his ability to cope with the external problem confronting him, and by his sense of resoluteness in overcoming his own defects. By analogy, I would suggest that we in the United States will have less need to overlook our own shortcomings or to be fascinated with the defects of others to the extent that we have a thriving society which is resolutely overcoming its own problems of racial prejudice, economic stagnation, and lack of dedication to common public purposes.

While distortions in perception are very common for the reasons I have outlined above, it is also true that, in many instances, everyday experience provides a corrective to the distortions. When reality is sufficiently compelling, and when the contact with reality occurs with sufficient frequency, the distortions will be challenged and may yield. However, there are circumstances which tend to perpetuate and rigidify distortions. Let me briefly describe three major reasons for the perpetuation of distortions:

1. *A major psychological investment has been made in the distortion.* As a consequence, the individual may anticipate that giving up the investment will require drastic personal reorganization which might result in personal instability and the loss of social face and might precipitate unknown dangers. Anyone who has done psychoanalytic therapy with neurotic patients knows that no matter how costly and painful it is, a distorted but familiar mode of adjustment is hard to give up until the patient has sufficient self-confidence or confidence in his analyst to venture into unfamiliar terrain.

With regard to international relations, I think we have to consider that a disarmed world, a world without external tensions to justify internal political policies, a world without violence as a means of bringing about changes in the status quo would be an unfamiliar world: a world in which some would feel that their vested interests might be destroyed. For example, I am sure that many military men, scientists, industrialists, workers, and investors fear a disarmed world because they anticipate that their skills and knowledge will become obsolete, or they will lose social status, or they will lose financially. These fears have to be dealt with constructively or else they may produce defensive adherence to the views which justify a hostile, armed world. I suggest that we must carefully plan to anticipate the psychological difficulties in the transition to a peaceful, disarmed world. As a basic strategy to overcome some of these difficulties, I would recommend that we consider a policy of *overcompensating* those who might be adversely affected by the change: we want to change the nature of their psychological investment from an investment in military pursuits to one in peaceful pursuits.

2. *Certain distorted perceptions perpetuate themselves because they lead the individual to avoid contact or meaningful communication*

with the object or person being perceived. This is especially true when the distortions lead to aversion or hostility toward the object being perceived. For example, for reasons which go back to my childhood and about which I am not clear, I have a strong aversion to coffee, becoming nauseated at the thought of drinking it. As a consequence, I avoid coffee and my aversion is perpetuated. Newcomb (1947) has described a similar process of *autistic hostility* in interpersonal relations in which a hostile impulse may give rise to barriers to communication behind which a persistent attitude is protected. Similarly, in international relations, hostile attitudes between the U.S. and Communist China produce barriers to communication which eliminate the possibility of a change in attitudes. Here, the best antidote would seem to be communication which followed the rules of procedure suggested by Anatol Rapoport.

3. Merton, in his classic paper on *The Self-fulfilling Prophecy* (1957), has pointed out that distortions are often perpetuated because they may evoke new behavior which makes the originally *false* conception come true. The specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. The prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the very beginning. The dynamics of the self-fulfilling prophecy help to explain individual pathology—e.g., the anxious student who, afraid he might fail, worries so much that he cannot study, with the consequence that he does fail. It also contributes to our understanding of social pathology—e.g., how prejudice and discrimination against the Negro keeps him in a position which seems to justify the prejudice and discrimination. So too in international relations. If the representatives of East and West believe that war is likely and either side attempts to increase its military security vis-à-vis the other, the other side's response will justify the initial move. The dynamics of an arms race has the inherent quality of a "folie à deux," wherein the self-fulfilling prophecies mutually reinforce one another.

Psychological Alternatives to War

In the preceding section, I have attempted to indicate some of the sources of misperception in international relations and some of the conditions which tend to perpetuate the distortions or make them come true. Our present international situation suggests that the distortions have come true. The East and the West are in an arms race and in the throes of an ideological conflict in which each side, in reality, threatens and feels threatened by the other. How can we reverse this hostile spiral which is likely to result in mutual annihilation?

As I present some specific proposal, I will indicate the psychological assumptions underlying them: assumptions which come from

theoretical and experimental research I have been doing on interpersonal trust and suspicion and interpersonal bargaining (Deutsch, 1949; 1958; 1960a; 1960b; 1961; Deutsch & Krauss, 1960).

1. *There are social situations which do not allow the possibility of "rational" behavior so long as the conditions for mutual trust do not exist.* Let me illustrate with a two-person game that I have used in my experimental work on trust and suspicion. In this game, each player has to choose between pressing a red button and a green button: if both players press the red button each loses \$1.00; if both players press the green button, each wins \$1.00; if Player A presses the green button and Player B presses the red button, A loses \$2.00 and B gains \$2.00; and if Player B presses the green button and Player A presses the red button, B loses \$2.00 and A gains \$2.00. A superficial rational calculation of self-interest would lead each player to press his red button since he either wins as much as he can or loses as little as he can this way. But, if both players consider only their self-interest and press their red buttons, each of them will lose. Players oriented toward defeating the other player or toward their self-interest only, when matched with similarly oriented players, do in fact choose the red button and do end up losing consistently.

I believe our current international situation is in some respects similar to the game I have described. A characteristic symptom of such "nonrational situations" is that any attempt on the part of any individual or nation to increase its own welfare or security (without regard to the security or welfare of the others) is self-defeating. In such situations the only way that an individual or nation can avoid being trapped in a mutually reinforcing, self-defeating cycle is to attempt to change the situation so that a basis of mutual trust can develop.

Comprehension of the basic nature of the situation we are in suggests that *mutual security* rather than national security should be our objective. The basic military axiom for both the East and West should be that *military actions should only be taken which increase the military security of both sides; military actions which give a military superiority to one side or the other should be avoided.* The military forces of both sides should be viewed as having the *common* primary aim of preventing either side (one's own or the other) from starting a deliberate or accidental war. Awareness of this common aim could be implemented by regular meetings of military leaders from East and West; the establishment of a continuing joint technical group of experts to work together to formulate disarmament and inspection plans; the establishment of mixed military units on each other's territory (see Kelman, forthcoming); etc. The key point we must recognize is that if military inferiority is dangerous, so is military

"superiority"; it is dangerous for either side to feel *tempted* or *frightened* into military action.

2. *Our research indicates that mutual trust is most likely to occur when people are positively oriented to each other's welfare—i.e., when each has a stake in the other's doing well rather than poorly.* Unfortunately, the East and West, at present, appear to have a greater stake in each other's defects and difficulties than in each other's welfare. Thus, the Communists gloat over our racial problems and our unemployment and we do likewise over their agricultural failures and their lack of political liberties.

We should, I believe, do everything possible to reverse this unfortunate state of affairs. First of all, we might start by accepting each other's existence as *legitimate* and by rejecting the view that the existence of the other, *per se*, is a threat to our own existence. As Talcott Parsons (forthcoming) has pointed out, there is considerable merit in viewing the ideological battle between East and West in the world community as somewhat akin to our own two-party system at the national level. An ideological conflict presupposes a common frame of reference in terms of which the ideological differences make sense. The ideologies of East and West do share many values in common: technological advance, economic development, universal education, encouragement of science, cultural progress, health advances, peace, national autonomy, etc. We must accept the possibility that one side or the other will obtain an advantage on particular issues when there is a conflict about the procedures for attaining these objectives. But this is not catastrophic unless each side views the conflict as an all-or-none conflict of survival.

To establish a basis for mutual trust we, of course, have to go beyond the recognition of each other's legitimacy to a relationship which promotes cooperative bonds. This would be facilitated by recognition of the profound human similarities which link all mankind together. The human situation no longer makes it feasible to view the world in terms of "we" or "they"; in the modern era, our destinies are linked objectively; the realistic attitude is "we" *and* "they." More specifically, I think our situation would be improved rather than worsened if the people in the various Communist nations had a high standard of living, were well educated, and were reaping the fruits of the scientific revolution. Similarly, I think we would be better off rather than worse off if the political leaders of the Communist nations felt they were able to provide their citizenry with sufficient current gratifications and signs of progress to have their support; and if they were sufficiently confident of their own society not to fear intensive contacts with different points of view.

The implication of the above calls for a fundamental reorientation of our foreign policy toward the Communist nations. We must ini-

tiate cooperative trade policies, cooperative research programs, cooperative cultural exchanges, cooperative loan programs, cooperative agricultural programs, etc., and we must not be concerned if, at first, they appear to benefit more than we. We are, after all, more affluent than the Communist nations. Our objective should be simply to promote the values of economic well-being, educational attainment, scientific and industrial development which we share in common and which we believe are necessary to a stable, peaceful world. Let me emphasize here that I think this is especially important to do in our relations with Communist China. (It amazes me constantly that so little public attention is given to the extraordinary dangers involved in allowing our current relations with Communist China to continue in their present form.) The Communist nations (especially China) are likely to be suspicious of our motives, may even rebuff our initial attempts to establish cooperative relationships, and will undoubtedly not feel grateful for any assistance they may receive. These reactions are all to be expected because of the present context of international relations. Our policy of cooperation must be a *sustained* policy of *massive reconciliation* which does not reciprocate hostility and which always leaves open the possibility of mutual cooperation despite prior rebuff. In my view, we must sustain a cooperative initiative until it succeeds; in the long run, the alternative to mutual cooperation is mutual doom.

My rationale here is very simple. We have no realistic alternative but to coexist with the Soviet Union and Communist China. Coexistence among nations will be considerably less dangerous if we each recognize that poverty, illiteracy, economic difficulties, internal strain and crisis in a nation are likely to produce reckless, belligerent international policies rather than peaceful ones. After all, the delinquents and criminals in our local communities rarely come from those segments of our populace that are successfully dealing with their own internal problems or that are well integrated into and accepted by the broader community.

3. *To induce a cooperative orientation in another and to develop adherence to a set of rules or social norms for regulating interaction and for resolving disputes, it is necessary: (a) to demonstrate that one's own orientation to the other is cooperative; (b) to articulate fair rules which do not systematically disadvantage the other; (c) to demonstrate one's adherence to these rules; (d) to demonstrate to the other that he has more to gain (or less to lose) in the short and long run by adherence to the rules than by violation of them; and (e) to recognize that misunderstandings and disputes about compliance will inevitably occur and hence are not necessarily tokens of bad faith.*

The importance of a cooperative orientation to the development of mutual trust has been discussed above; it is reiterated here to emphasize the significance of a cooperative orientation in the devel-

opment of any workable system of rules to regulate international relations. In discussion and negotiations concerning arms control and disarmament, there has been much emphasis on developing rules and procedures for inspection and control which do not rely upon cooperative orientations; surveillance of the other's actions is to replace trust in the other's intent. I think it is reasonable to assert that no social order can exist for long without a minimum basis in mutual trust; surveillance cannot do the trick by itself. This is not to deny the necessity of surveillance to buttress trust, to enable one's trustworthiness to be confirmed and one's suspicions to be rejected. However, I would question the view which seems to characterize our approach to arms control negotiations: namely, the less trust, the more surveillance. A more reasonable view might state that when there is little trust the only kinds of agreements which are feasible are ones which allow for simple, uncomplicated but highly reliable techniques of surveillance. Lack of trust between equals, paradoxically, calls for but also limits surveillance when the negotiations are not part of an effective community.

The inducing of adherence to rules to establish orderly relations among nations requires fair rules. It is easier to state the characteristics of an unfair than a fair rule: a rule is unfair if the party favoring it would be unwilling to accept it, were he in the situation of the other side. The history of disarmament negotiations suggests that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has been interested in proposing fair rules. Noguee (1960) asserts (p. 282): "Every plan offered by either side has contained a set of proposals calculated to have wide popular appeal. Every set has included at least one feature that the other side could not possibly accept, thus forcing a rejection. Then the proposing side has been able to claim that the rejection is opposed to the idea of disarmament *in toto*. The objectionable feature may be thought of as the 'joker' in every series." He further points out (p. 281) "Disarmament negotiations themselves have become a weapon in the cold war. Speeches made in commission, committee, and Plenary Assembly have more often been designed to influence different segments of opinion than to reach an accommodation with the other nations represented at the conference table."

How can the formulation of fair rules be facilitated? A suggestion by Bertrand Russell (forthcoming) is pertinent here. He proposes the formation of a conciliation committee composed of the best minds from the East and West, with some of the leading thinkers from neutral nations also included. Such a committee, meeting together in quiet, unpublicized deliberation, might be given the responsibility of formulating rules which would be acceptable to both sides. The hope is that, with sufficient time, intelligent men of good will whose per-

spectives reach beyond the cold war may be able to formulate rules that are fair to all mankind.

Fair rules for certain matters, of course, do already exist. Some of these rules are written in the Charter of the United Nations, some in the decisions of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, some in the legal traditions which have governed various aspects of international relations through the centuries (e.g., the international postal system, international trade, "freedom of the seas," ambassadorial rights). As Arthur Larson (forthcoming) has pointed out, there is much need for legal research to make the existing body of international rules accessible and up-to-date and establish a legal machinery which is also accessible and adapted to settling the kinds of disputes that today's world produces. In addition, there is a need to induce acceptance of the body of law and legal machinery by the persons affected.

How to induce acceptance of such rules once they are formulated? It seems clear that if we wish to induce others to accept fair rules, our own course of conduct must exemplify supra-nationalistic or universalistic values; it must constantly indicate our willingness to live up to the values that we expect others to adhere to. We must give up the doctrine of "special privilege" and the "double standard" in judging our own conduct and that of the Communist nations. Can we really convince others that we are for international law when we reserve the right (in the so-called Connally amendment) unilaterally to declare a controversy to be a domestic matter and hence outside the World Court's jurisdiction? Can we really be persuasive when we reserve the right to intervene unilaterally against the establishment of a Communist nation in the Western hemisphere but deny a similar right to the Soviet Union and China? Do we promote international order when we use our power in the United Nations to prevent the admission of the most populous nation in the world and, thus, exclude it from discussion of matters which relate to its interests? We only undermine the possibility of establishing a world rule of law by declaring our sovereign interests to be above the law: the deepest legal traditions in all parts of the world rest upon the view that the sovereign is not above the law—he is under the law.

Would adherence to universalistic values and international law on our part allow a violator of fair rules of international conduct to profit and, thus, encourage his violation? Certainly, it makes no sense to encourage violations. However, an effective system of rules clearly defines what a violation is, specifies the procedure for ascertaining whether an act is a violation, prescribes the sanctions to be invoked against violations, and indicates the rights of self-defense or redress to the aggrieved party. Such a system presumably deters violation by making it unprofitable but it also limits and controls the response to

violation so that it is appropriate and under law. We must, of course, be prepared to discourage violations of fair practices and to defend ourselves against them, but we cannot afford to do so in disregard of the universalistic values we espouse.

I suggest that our *attitude* toward violations should express, simultaneously, firm resistance to violations when they occur and clear receptivity to the possibility of renewing cooperative relations. Re-cremnations and a punitive, self-righteous attitude toward violations are unlikely to encourage the development of a desire for normal, civilized relations. Retaliation (counterthreat in response to threat, counteraggression in response to aggression) tends, rather, to nourish and intensify an existing or incipient hostile spiral. Policy guided by the need to demonstrate that one is "man enough" to be tough, that one isn't "chicken," tends to change situations where there is room for negotiation into competitive struggles for "face." Once this occurs, it becomes difficult indeed to yield without a severe loss of self-esteem.

4. *Mutual trust can occur even under circumstances where the parties involved are unconcerned with each other's welfare providing their relations to an outside, third party are such that this trust in him can substitute for their trust in one another.* This indirect or mediated trust is, of course, a most common form of trust in interpersonal relations. Since we exist in a community in which various types of third parties—the law, the police, public opinion, mutual friends, etc.—can be mobilized to buttress an agreement, we can afford to be trusting even with a stranger in most circumstances. Unfortunately, in a bipolar world community, which does not contain powerful "third parties," it is difficult to substitute mediated trust for direct trust.

There are two policy implications of this fact which I would like to stress. The first is the importance of encouraging the development of several strong, neutral groups of nations and the development of a strong, neutral United Nations that might mediate in conflicts between East and West. We have, of course, to be aware of the dangers of a *tertius gaudens*, in which a third party would attempt to play East and West off against one another to its own advantage. However, what I am suggesting is not a third bloc but rather a group of diverse, independent nations with criss-crossing interests that have the common objective of developing and maintaining an orderly world. In a neutral United Nations,⁵ with a large group of independent voters, we would sometimes find ourselves on the losing side. But can we afford a United Nations in which the other side has little chance of ever winning a dispute with us?

⁵ For a proposal to neutralize the United Nations, see Louis Sohn (forthcoming).

The second implication follows from the realization that strong, responsible, independent nations and a strong, neutral United Nations do not yet exist and will take time to develop. Where no strong external community exists, it is important to recognize that bargaining—i.e., the attempt to find a mutually satisfactory agreement in circumstances where there is a conflict of interest—cannot afford to be guided by a Machiavellian or “outwitting the other” attitude. Where no external community exists to compel agreement, the critical problem in bargaining is to establish sufficient community between the bargainers that a mutually satisfactory agreement becomes possible: the question of who obtains the minor advantages or disadvantages in a negotiation is trivial in comparison to the question of whether an agreement can be reached which leaves both parties better off than a lack of agreement. I stress this point because some political scientists and economists, misled by the fact that bargaining within a strong community can often fruitfully be conducted with a Machiavellian attitude, unwittingly assume that the same would be true where no real community exists.

In concluding this section, let me quote from a monograph on the *Causes of Industrial Peace* (National Planning Association, 1953, p. 92) which lists the conditions that have led to peaceful settlement of disputes under collective bargaining:

1. There is full acceptance by management of the collective bargaining process and of unionism as an institution. The company considers a strong union an asset to management.
2. The union fully accepts private ownership and operation of the industry; it recognizes that the welfare of its members depends upon the successful operation of the business.
3. The union is strong, responsible, and democratic.
4. The company stays out of the union's internal affairs; it does not seek to alienate the workers' allegiance to their union.
5. Mutual trust and confidence exist between the parties. There have been no serious ideological incompatibilities.
6. Neither party to bargaining has adopted a legalistic approach to the solution of problems in the relationship.
7. Negotiations are “problem-centered”—more time is spent on day-to-day problems than on defining abstract principles.
8. There is widespread union-management consultation and highly developed information-sharing.
9. Grievances are settled promptly, in the local plant whenever possible. There is flexibility and informality within the procedure.

This is in accord with our discussion of the basic conditions for world peace: namely, the necessity of developing attitudes which consciously stress mutual acceptance, mutual welfare, mutual strength, mutual interest, and mutual trust and the necessity of developing ap-

proaches to disputes which consistently emphasize full communication, willingness to negotiate, and the specific issues in dispute rather than the ideological frame of reference of the parties in dispute.

The Conflict Between East and West

Underlying my discussion throughout this paper has been the thesis that the conflict between East and West can be resolved peacefully. This thesis grows out of the assumption that the only alternative to peace is mutual catastrophe. The conflict must be resolved peacefully, but can it be?

Public statements of the leaders of the two blocs define the conflict as a confrontation of two mutually irreconcilable ideologies; and we must acknowledge that basic ideological differences do exist. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that neither the United States nor the USSR closely resembles its ideological "ideal type." Neither Karl Marx nor Adam Smith would recognize his offspring.

But the conflict of the Cold War has intensified our perception of ideological differences, while at the same time reducing our ability to perceive similarities. Thus, we in the West see a conflict between "free societies and a totalitarian system that is attempting to dominate the world." At the same time, our counterparts in the East see a conflict between "a system that represents the interests of the masses of the people and the imperialist, capitalist ruling cliques that wish to continue their exploitation of the people." Both descriptions are essentially mirror images of each other, each side claiming that their side stands for just, universalistic values which are opposed by the other side. We, in the West, however, see human justice as being threatened by the expansionist tendencies of the East while the leaders in the East see human justice being thwarted by the West's attempt to maintain the status-quo and to stem (what they consider to be) the natural tide of history.

The dominant theme of Freudian psychology is that the manifest life of the mind—i.e., what men know or pretend to know about the motives of their behavior—is often merely a socially acceptable rationalization of their unrecognized or latent motives. The difference between the manifest and latent content of behavior results from the need to present one's behavior to oneself, as well as to others, so as not to lose social or self-esteem. This need to "maintain face" can, of course, in turn be a determiner of behavior. I suggest that, although there are basic ideological differences between the East and West, the intensity of the ideological struggle primarily reflects an anachronistic power struggle between nations that have defined their prestige and security in terms of world leadership. The ideological differences within the West (e.g., between the U.S. and Portugal) or within the

East (e.g., between Russia and China) are often as gross as those between East and West.

I suggest that if the United States and Russia were both capitalist or both communist nations, a similar struggle would have developed so long as each entertained some conception of itself as the leading world power. DeTocqueville anticipated this development in his book, *Democracy in America*, written in the 1830's before communism existed as a political ideology. Moreover, I suggest that similar power struggles can be expected with a somewhat altered cast as Western Europe re-emerges as a cohesive, powerful group, as Communist China develops, as some of the nations in Africa, Latin America, and Asia grow in strength. As more and more countries develop their economic potentials, it is likely that power will become more widely diffused and that the present conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union will be viewed as largely irrelevant by the rest of the world.

Traditionally, the quest for world power has been closely bound to strivings for national security, economic dominance, and/or international prestige or influence. The quest for power has commonly taken the form of the attempt to establish military supremacy. In previous sections of this paper, I have stressed the anachronism of the drive for military supremacy in the age of missiles and hydrogen bombs. Similarly, I believe the more powerful nations are beginning to recognize that the best opportunities for economic exploitation will arise from scientific research and development rather than from colonial domination, Eastern or Western style.

However, the quest for international prestige and influence is, I believe, a reasonable one for all societies. Hence we must find alternative social institutions and processes to militarism and war by which this quest can be pursued. Etzioni (forthcoming) has suggested a number of criteria which are relevant to the kinds of social institutions which should be created. Namely, the international competition for prestige should involve many different kinds of contests which are repeated at frequent intervals so that defeat is never *total* or irreversible. Moreover, he proposes that there be many different contestants in every contest so that competition is diffuse rather than sharply focussed. I further propose that competition be centered about achievements which represent genuine accomplishments of which all mankind can be proud.

Specifically, I suggest that the United Nations (or some other organization which includes Communist China) organize a series of periodic international contests which would enable the different nations of the world to reveal their achievements and progress in such fields as art, music, literature, the various sciences, space exploration, education, economic development, agriculture, sports, ballet, the theatre, cooking, architecture, medicine, women's fashions, the domestic

arts, children's books, etc. The contests should be diverse enough to permit each national culture to display its unique attainments. The rules should require that the knowledge, skills, and techniques of the contest winners be made freely available to every nation. Awards might be granted on two separate bases: the relative level of absolute achievement and the relative amount of progress since the last contest. It is assumed that the societies who win many contests will be the ones who are effective in developing a culture that is richly creative and a populace who is educated, talented, and resourceful. There are, of course, difficulties in implementing such a proposal: in developing contests and rules which are not stacked for or against any nations. However, since the kinds of contests I am proposing already exist within many nations, there is a vast body of experience which can be drawn upon to develop workable rules.

I suggest that the United States, with the co-sponsorship of the Soviet Union, take the initiative in submitting such a proposal to the United Nations. If we are to engage in international competition for prestige and influence, let it be in peaceful rather than in militaristic pursuits, let it be in achievements from which all mankind can profit, let it be in activities which promote the recognition of the common values of mankind.

I conclude my paper with an Intellectual's Manifesto: Intellectuals, Scientists, Scholars, and Academicians of the world unite: we have nothing to lose but our ideological blinders. The problems besetting the world are too serious to permit our work to be beclouded by dogma or narrowly-conceived national interest. We cannot afford to let the slogans and categories of ideological conflict dominate our intellectual analysis. We must be free to view the great problems of our time—the nuclear arms race, the tremendous disparities in standards of living among the nations of the world, racial prejudice, ideological intolerance and the rapid increase in the world's population—in a way that allows us to take advantage of the explosion in knowledge now taking place. Let us begin to replace dogmatic, ideological assertion with an open-minded, objective, factual test of our theories and hypotheses about economic development, social change, and the development of creative, responsible people. Only by so doing will our common objectives of creating a saner, comelier, and more amicable life be achieved.

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